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I. INTRODUCTION
How do we decide that a finding, study, or other piece of in-
formation or phenomenon is scientific? Fundamentally, our un-
derstanding requires us to define science. The process of deciding
what is and what is not scientific has proven controversial in our le-
gal system. Underlying the controversy is what proves to be a harsh
reality for litigants: without expert testimony, a party may not be
able to establish her claim. Determining the validity of scientific
testimony in federal court is governed by the principles annunci-
ated in a 1993 Supreme Court opinion. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 the Supreme Court considered what consti-
tuted scientific knowledge pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal
t KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS (1997). Kenneth R. Foster is an Associate
Professor of Bioengineering, University of Pennsylvania; Peter W. Huber serves as
a Senior Fellow of the Manhattan Institute.
tf Assistant Professor, Southern University Law Center.
1. Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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Rules of Evidence. The decision has stirred a steady stream of de-
bate. The number of academic articles in which Daubert is cited ex-
ceeds 1,000;' it seems as if everyone has taken a spin.5 The Su-
preme Court's decision continues to generate a divergence of
opinions between and within the circuits.6
Daubert was intended to end the debate over the use of the Frye
test7 of admissibility of expert opinion.8 During the period follow-
3. See id. at 589-90. The Daubert case involved a claim against a manufacturer
of a drug that allegedly caused birth defects. See id. at 582. The plaintiff sought to
introduce expert testimony based on animal studies, chemical structure analysis,
and human statistical studies. See id. at 583-84. The trial court held and court of
appeals affirmed that this evidence did not meet the requirements for admissibility
set forth by Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 584-85 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court held that the trial judge must
make a preliminary determination, the judge should consider testing of the scien-
tific evidence, peer review and publication, its error rate, and standards for its op-
eration and general acceptance. See id. at 593-96.
4. WESTLAW search performed on Sept. 30, 1998.
5. See, e.g., KennethJ. Chesebro, Taking Daubert's "Focus" Seriously: The Meth-
odology/Conclusion Distinction, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 1745 (1994) (arguing that Dau-
bert is best understood by concentrating on the distinction between the "principles
and methodology" used by an expert and the "conclusions" thereby reached by
the expert); Michael H. Gottesman, Should Federal Evidence Rules Trump State Tort
Policy? The Federalism Values Daubert Ignored, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837 (1994) (ar-
guing that federal courts should not trump state choices concerning when expert
testimony will be admissible in litigation over issues controlled by state law, nor
should they trump state choices as to what evidence is sufficient to establish a state
law claim); Clifton T. Hutchinson & Danny S. Ashby, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Redefining the Bases for Admissibility of Expert Scientific Testi-
mony, 15 CAPDozo L. REv. 1875 (1994) (concluding that while no theory of admis-
sibility of scientific testimony can eliminate all "battles of the experts," Daubert pro-
vides a workable framework for limiting the battle to disputes in which the
application of well-founded contested theories reasonably may lead to different
conclusions).
6. See Jay P. Kesan, A Critical Examination of the Post-Daubert Scientific Land-
scape, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 237-39 (1997) (noting various circuit court deci-
sions that have both narrowly and liberally construed Daubert); Douglas P. Richard,
Regulating Expert Testimony, 62 Mo. L. REv. 485, 501-02 (1997) (recognizing the lib-
eral construction of Daubert); Nancy S. Ferrell, Congressional Action to Amend Federal
Rule of Evidence 702: A Mischievous Attempt to Codify Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc., 13J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 523, 540-41 (1997) (noting
that circuit court decisions reflect an underlying tension as to exactly how and
when the Daubert analysis will lead to the inadmissibility of expert testimony).
7. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The Frye court ad-
dressed the admissibility of expert testimony concerning the validity of a systolic
blood pressure deception test, an early form of lie detector. See id. at 1013. The
Frye court held that to be admitted, expert testimony must be deduced from prin-
ciples or discoveries that are "sufficiently established to have gained general accep-
tance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014. The court held that
the test had not "gained general acceptance" in the scientific community. Id. For
[Vol. 25
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ing the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975 and prior
to Daubert, courts were presented with essentially two choices when
addressing the issue of expert testimony: the traditional common
law rule first articulated in Fye, or a new rule based on the lan-
guage of Rule 702. 9 Under Fye, expert testimony was admissible if
based on "generally accepted" scientific technique. 10 The rule be-
came questioned upon the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, which did not codify the "generally accepted" language
from Frye. Rather, Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise."
Some pre-Daubert courts were unwilling to graft "generally ac-
cepted" onto the language of Rule 702." In 1993, the Supreme
Court agreed and displaced the Frye rule with the Court's newly-
minted interpretation of "scientific . . . knowledge." 3 The Court
created a non-exhaustive, multi-factor test to use in determining
whether or not proposed testimony constituted scientific knowl-
a summary of the history of Frye and its influence on the law of evidence, see 1
DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTimONY§§ 1-2.1-1-2.4 (1997).
8. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585 (noting that a split in decisions of different
courts of appeals was one reason the Supreme Court decided to accept the ap-
peal).
9. Compare United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59-60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (ap-
plying the "general acceptance" standard) with DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting the "general acceptance" stan-
dard).
10. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014. Frye was not without its critics. See CHARLEs T.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 170, at 363 (1954) (comment-
ing on the inherent difficulty of applying the "general acceptance" test of Frye).
For a more in-depth discussion of pre-Daubert rules for testing the admissibility of
expert testimony, see Jay P. Kesan, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert
World, 84 CEO. L.J. 1985, 1989-97 (1996) (comparing the Frye test to other pre-
Daubert approaches to the admissibility of scientific evidence).
11. FED. R. EVID. 702.
12. See, e.g., DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 955 (noting that the Frye rule was too vague
and often yielded inconsistent results).
13. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
1999]
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edge. 14 The factors include the condition that expert testimony be
relevant. 5 Proposed testimony also must be reliable based upon a
showing of "scientific validity."' 6 The proposed testimony is judged
for its "scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry. "'7 Whether
the methodology which is the foundation for the proposed testi-
mony can be (or has been) tested can also be considered." Peer
review and publication may also aid in determining the admissibil-
ity of expert opinion. 9 The rate of error for a scientific technique
is another factor. Whether a particular technique is accepted
within the relevant scientific community is also a consideration.'
While the Court resolved the issue of whether Frye survived the pas-
sage of the Federal Rules of Evidence, it invited different ap-
proaches to analyzing the admissibility of expert opinion: "The in-
quiry envisioned by rule 702 is . . . a flexible one."22  Non-
standardized approaches are further encouraged by the standard of
review, manifestly erroneous, giving district court's broad discre-
23tion.
14. See id. at 593 n.12.
15. See id. at 591.
16. Id. at 593.
17. Id. at 592.
18. See id. at 593. In a subsequent case, General Electric Co. v.Joiner, 118 S. Ct.
512, 519 (1997) the Court explained that:
[N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence
requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.
A court may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical
gap between the data and the opinion proffered.
Id.
19. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
20. See id. at 594.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. See General Elec., 118 S. Ct. at 517.
[Vol. 25
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II. REVIEWINGJUDGING SCIENCE
A. Foster and Hubert on Daubert
In Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and the Federal Courts,"
Foster and Huber join the cacophony of voices suggesting various
interpretations of Daubert. They illustrate how Rule 702 may be in-
terpreted to exclude a proposed expert's testimony, using the facts
of Daubert as a case study. Each major chapter focuses on a Daubert
factor. In Chapter 2, "fit" is explored. 5 In Chapter 3, testing is
discussed.26 Here, Foster and Huber focus on the Court's discus-
sion on the theory and process of falsification in scientific method-
ology.2 7 In Chapter 4, Foster and Huber explain scientific concep-
tions about rate of error and its role in scientific methodology. 8
Another factor, reliability, is developed in Chapter 5.9 Foster and
Huber spend considerable time summarizing Bayesian statistics as a
means of determining reliability. ° The validity of a particular sci-
entific methodology is the subject of Chapter 6.' Finally, the role
of peer review in the scientific community is introduced in Chapter
7.32 The last major chapter, Chapter 8, provides Foster and Huber's
interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403."
Foster and Huber are to be commended for summarizing and
explaining scientific concepts to their presumably neophyte audi-
24. KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS (1997).
25. See id. at 23-36.
26. See id. at 37-68.
27. See id. at 38-44.
28. See id. at 69-110.
29. See id. at 111-36.
30. See id. at 147-50.
31. See id. at 137-62.
32. See id. at 163-205.
33. See id. at 207-24. Rule 403 allows for the exclusion of evidence "if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury." FED. R. EVID. 403. "The underlying
premise of the Rule is that certain relevant evidence should not be admitted to the
trier of fact where the admission would result in an adverse effect upon the effec-
tiveness or integrity of the fact finding process." GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL
RULE OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY, AND AUTHORITY §
403.1 (2d ed. 1995). In addition to Rule 702, ajudge may rely on Rule 403 to ex-
clude scientific evidence that may mislead or confuse a jury. See CHRISTOPHER B.
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ence. While decidedly a conservative viewpoint permeates their
analysis, Foster and Huber's discussion of plaintiff's experts in
Bendectin litigation proved insightful. Each chapter includes ex-
cerpts from outside firsthand sources. This format is appropriate
since Daubert contemplates a certain level of scientific knowledge
on the part ofjudges. But no one knows the extent to which that is
a valid assumption.34 Foster and Huber's book is one, among oth-
ers, which could help fill deficiencies in judges, as well as lawyers,
scientific understanding. 5 Judges and plaintiff's lawyers would be
wise to give it a careful read. The book is a "how-to" for excluding
plaintiffs' scientific experts. However, it is also a sound introduc-
tion to ideas and concepts which are the sine quo non of scientific
understanding.
Implicit in Foster and Huber's discussion is the assumption
that junk science3 and trans-science3 should be excluded from the
courtroom.8 This is not a new theme. Huber's prior works, par-
ticularly Galileo's Revenge:Junk Science in the Courtroom,39 denounced
what he considers poor-quality, expert scientific testimony.40 Judg-
34. Cf General Electric Co., 118 S. Ct. at 520 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing
Briefs of the Trial Lawyers for Public Justice and New England Journal of Medicine
as Amicus Curiae).
35. See, e.g., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (Federal Judicial Cen-
ter 1994) (a treatise on scientific and technological evidence).
36. Foster and Huber explained:
Junk science arises when a witness seeks to present grossly falla-
cious interpretations of scientific data or opinions that are not
supported by scientific evidence. Junk science is a legal prob-
lem, not a scientific one. It is cultivated by the adversarial na-
ture of legal proceedings, and it depends on the difficulty many
laypeople have in evaluating technical arguments.
FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 24, at 17. See also PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S
REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 2 (1991). "An example of 'junk sci-
ence' that should be excluded under Daubert as too unreliable would be the testing
of a phrenologist who would purport to prove a defendant's future dangerousness
based on the contours of the defendant's skull." General Elec., 118 S. Ct. at 522 n.6
(Stevens, J., concurring).
37. Trans-science involves questions "asked of science and yet which cannot
be answered by science .... Though they are, epistemologically speaking, ques-
tions of fact and can be stated in the language of science, they are unanswerable
by science; they transcend science." FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 24, at 56 (quot-
ing Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972)).
38. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 24, at 17, 56.
39. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1991).
40. See id. at 3; Peter W. Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 VAL. U. L. REV.
[Vol. 25
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ing Science recycles Huber's prior work by casting the best conserva-
tive light on Daubert. From a conservative perspective this is signifi-
cant since to date, Daubert analysis has provided an entr6e to most
experts, foreclosing the possibility of truncating the litigation proc-S 41
ess by means of excluding evidence necessary to support a claim.
For that reason alone, Daubert will continue to generate contro-
versy. Additionally, the nature of the scientific enterprise and its
juncture with law and the courts gives rise to questions over the
admissibility of some expert testimony. We live in an era of rapidly
changing science and technology42 set in a context filled with de-
bates over junk science and cultural wars.4 Underlying this phe-
nomenon are debates over controlling knowledge, particularly sci-
entific knowledge, and its function in supporting jury awards in
45 46personal injury/toxic tort cases. 5  Unpopular or novel science
723, 755 (1992) (arguing for judges to cut out "junk" science in an attempt to
reach reliable results). In Galileo's Revenge, Huber wrote:
On the legal side, junk science is matched by what might be called
liability science, a speculative theory that expects lawyers, judges, and
juries to search for causes at the far fringes of science and beyond.
The legal establishment has adjusted the rules of evidence accord-
ingly, so that almost any self-styled scientist, not matter how strange
or iconoclastic his views, will be welcome to testify in court.
HUBER, supra note 39, at 3.
41. See Richard, supra note 6, at 501-02 (noting that under Daubert, expert tes-
timony is still liberally admitted); Kesan, supra note 6, at 238-39 (claiming that the
Daubert admissibility requirements are quite liberal).
42. See Eileen GayJones, Risky Assessments: Uncertainty in Science and the Human
Dimensions of Environmental Decisionmaking, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. REv. 1 (1997).
See also JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMM. 97 (Apr. 2, 1990) ("Economic, statistical, technological, and natural
and social scientific data are becoming increasingly important in both routine and
complex litigation.").
43. Compare HUBER, supra note 39, with Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort:
Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1637, 1722-26 (1993).
44. See Carl B. Meyer, Science and the Law: The Quest for the Neutral Expert Wit-
ness: A View from the Trenches, 12 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 35, 55-57 (1996-
1997).
45. See Keum J. Park, Judicial Utilization of Scientific Evidence in Complex Envi-
ronmental Torts: Redefining Litigation Driven Research, 7 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 483, 504
(1996); Suzanne E. Riley, The End of an Era: Junk Science Departs Products Liability, 63
DEF. COUNS.J. 502, 507 (1996).
46. "Novel scientific evidence refers to evidence or theories that have not re-
ceived approbation from the judicial or scientific communities." Erin K. L. Ma-
haney, Assessing the Fitness of Novel Scientific Evidence in the Post-Daubert Era: Pesticide
Exposure Cases as a Paradigm for Determining Admissibility, 26 ENVTL. L. 1161, 1161
(1996) (citing 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
1999]
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may be the only option for some plaintiffs. 47 We hear little about
the use of non-traditional science being used by defense counsel.48
This warrants further research.
B. Dangerous Science: Who Decides?
While the interpretation of Daubert poses interesting questions,
the issues underlying the opinion are even more intriguing. One
must ask why scientists are concerned with how courts interpret sci-
entific data and findings. In some respects, Foster and Huber state
too much, thus undermining their own presumptions in the proc-
ess. While they argue that there is such an enterprise as good sci-
ence, and indeed, provide a persuasive case for their brand of it,
the book nevertheless stands as an illustration of the battles that are
49being waged among scientists. Surely other scientists could pro-
vide their spin, different from Foster and Huber's, that would also
be relevant and thoughtful. ° Foster and Huber also fail to coher-
ently address the pressing question implicit in their proposition
that lay Americans and judges should be excluded from some areas
of scientific inquiry, namely those not accepted by traditional scien-
tific institutions, such as the National Academy of Sciences. The
endeavors of scientists who have not been reviewed or accepted by
elite scientific groups would be beyond the purview of non-
scientists (particularly jurors) under Foster and Huber's proposal.
Non-elite science may be ridden with errors, misleading, even dan-
gerous, but the question is: who decides? This is a contextual ques-
tion, requiring one to critically assess the purpose for which the in-
formation will be used. Specifically, who should judge the quality
of the scientific endeavor for the purposes of one particular law-
suit? Foster and Huber want scientists to act as gatekeepers.
There are other issues raised by this premise that need further
exploration. Should scientists sit as a de facto jury over a legal dis-
pute between two private citizens? In the American form of de-
§ 702[03], at 702-43 (1995)).
47. See id. at 1176.
48. For further discussion on this topic, see Chesebro, supra note 32, at 1679-
86.
49. See Anthony Z. Roisman, Conflict Resolution in the Courts: The Role of Science,
15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1945, 1951 (1994) (examining the proper role of science in
litigation).
50. See, e.g., Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New
Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715 (1994).
[Vol. 25
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mocracy, processes for seeking justice are housed in our govern-
mental institutions, particularly our courts of law. We depend
upon judges and jurors to make reasonable judgments reflective of
community standards. 5 With seemingly few exceptions, albeit
noteworthy and often sensationalized, they appear to do just that.
Foster and Huber's select cases that may provide evidence to the
contrary are not sufficiently persuasive52 such that we should aban-
don an important aspect of participatory democracy. Replacing
citizen jurors with a closed, elite body determining public issues is a
quite serious proposition. Our system is not optimal in an absolute
sense. Foster and Huber may very well be correct in their assump-
tion that on the average Americans are scientifically illiterate. The
cure, however, is not to exclude them from making judgments
about less popular forms of science. Rather, the nation should
make a more concerted effort to educate the populace generally,
and it is a function for lawyers to contextually educate jurors. Dark
accounts of befuddled and mislead jurors,54 if accurate, may reflect
poor lawyering,55 or that Foster and Huber are not accurate in their
assessment of what constitutes "bad" science. If, for example, an
expert's credentials are not stellar or appropriate for the testimony
she will provide, it is the lawyer's function to reveal this to the jury.
So while jurors may (or may not) come to court scientific illiterate,
they need not deliberate that way. Good lawyering is also responsi-
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (preserving the right to a trial by jury in crimi-
nal cases); U.S. CONST. amend. VII (preserving the right to a jury trial in civil
cases).
52. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 24, at 233 (discussing breast implant litiga-
tion).
53. See id at 215, 250. See also DOROTHYJ. HOWELL, SCIENTIFIC LITERAcY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLIcY 61(1992) (discussing the difficulties in regulatory policy
making in the pharmaceutical industry when the public does not have the capacity
to judge the accountability of the scientific community).
54. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 24, at 249-50.
55. Competent cross-examination can expose weaknesses in testimony. As
stated by Dr. Daryl E. Churbin: "All in all, whatever the pressures... generated by
the peer review system, cross-examination is, quite literally, a far more trying expe-
rience." Brian Stuart Koukoutchos, Solomon Meets Galileo (And Isn't Quite Sure What
to Do with Him), 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 2237, 2251 (1994) (quoting Brief of Amici Cu-
riae Daryl E. Churbin et al., at 29, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S.C.
2786 (1993)). For example, in McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 61 F.3d 1038, 1043 (2d
Cir. 1993), the cross-examination of plaintiffs expert revealed issues regarding
their credentials and credibility. See also Conde v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 24 F.3d
809, 813-14 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that expert witnesses were unable to explain
key changes in test results).
1999]
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ble for ensuring that judges perform their gatekeeping function.
56
C. Effective Gatekeeping
Effective lawyering has in fact exposed weaknesses in proposed
expert testimony. A few cases illustrate this. Following Daubert, the
Supreme Court spoke again to the issue of expert testimony. In
General Electric Co. v. Joiner,17 the Court upheld a district court's de-
cision to exclude expert testimony. The district court had found
that plaintiffs expert testimony was not reliable because the studies
upon which the testimony was based did not support the expert's
conclusions. 8  Plaintiffs expert opined that human exposure to
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) caused small cell lung cancer,
the disease afflicting the plaintiff.5 9 One study showed a correlation
between PCBs and alveologenic adenomas (not small cell lung can-
cer) among infant mice injected directly with large doses of PCBs.6°
61Another study failed to associate lung cancer with PCB exposure.
Yet another study did not involve PCBs, but mineral oil.62 Obvi-
ously there was not a match between the disease from which plain-
tiff suffered and the studies relied upon by his expert.
For similar reasons, expert testimony was excluded in Penney v.
Praxair, Inc.63 In that case, the plaintiff was on medication while
undergoing a Position Emission Tomography (PET) scan of his
brain; those in the control group were not.64 Plaintiff was also sixty-
six years old, while the age of the members of the control group
was not known. 65  Both factors undermined the reliability of the
methodology as both medication and age can affect PET scan re-
56. Cf Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 111 F.3d 184, 188-89
(1st Cir. 1997) (denying counsel's request for a Daubert determination, which was
raised for the first time on appeal)..
57. 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997).
58. See id. at 516.
59. See id. at 518.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 518 (citing Pier Alberto Bertazzi et al., Cancer Mortality of Capaci-
tor Manufacturing Workers, 11 AM. J. INDUS. MED. 165, 172 (1987); J. Zach & D.
Munsch, Mortality of PBC Workers at the Monsanto Plant in Sauget, Illinois (Dec. 14,
1979) (unpublished report)).
62. See General Elec. Co. at 519 (citing A. Ronneberg et al., Mortality and Inci-
dence of Cancer Among Oil-Exposed Workers in a Norwegian Cable Manufacturing Com-
pany, 45 BRIT. J. INDUS. MED. 595 (1988) (detailing a study which concluded that
exposure to mineral oils probably contributed to development of lung cancer)).
63. 116 F.3d 330 (8th Cir. 1997).
64. See id. at 334.
65. See id. at 333.
10
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suits, 66 a concern not rebutted by plaintiffs evidence.
Expert testimony was also excluded in Summers v. Missouri Pa-
cific Railroad System. There, plaintiff claimed he became ill after
inhaling diesel exhaust fumes.69 The district court found that the
accepted methodology for testing reaction to chemical sensitivity
had not been employed by plaintiff's expert.0 Rather, he chose
unorthodox methodology generally used by adherents of "multiple
chemical sensitivity," or MCS.7' As MCS could not prove plaintiffs
claim against the defendant, nor could MCS testing prove chemical
sensitivity, the trial court refused to admit plaintiffs expert testi-
72mony.
Again, plaintiffs expert testimony was excluded in Cabarera v.
Cordis Corp.73 One expert was excluded because the proposed tes-
timony was based on testing unique to that expert.4 Moreover, the
expert had not subjected his methodology to peer review.75 In es-
sence, even though credentialed, the Cabarera court found that ex-
pert testimony has to have a more credible foundation than the
unchecked opinion of one person. Nor will unfounded conjecture
suffice. Another expert proffered by plaintiff was excluded as he
had not performed relevant tests on the plaintiff nor cited outside
studies to support his conclusion that plaintiff's illness was caused
66. See id.
67. See id. at 334.
68. 132 F.3d 599, 603-04 (10th Cir. 1997).
69. See id. at 602.
70. See id. at 604.
71. See id. at 603-04.
72. See id. For similar reasons, MCS expert testimony has been excluded in
other cases. See, e.g., Frank v. New York, 972 F. Supp. 130 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (involv-
ing state employees who brought an action against the state under the ADA, claim-
ing they had not made reasonable accommodations for workers' multiple chemi-
cal sensitivity); Sanderson v. Int'l Flowers & Fragrances, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 981
(C.D. Cal. 1996) (addressing a products liability claim against fragrance makers);
Summers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Sys., 897 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (reviewing
a claim by railroad employees of long term negative effects as a result of exposure
to diesel fumes); Carlin v. RYE Indus., Inc., No. 88-CV-842, 1995 WL 760739
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1995) (excluding testimony where an employee claimed harm
from exposure to isopropanol alcohol, freon, and other chemicals on the job);
Bradley v. Brown, 852 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (deciding employee personal
injury claims stemming from exposure to pesticides), affd, 42 F.3d 434 (7th Cir.
1994).
73. 134 F.3d 1418 (9th Cir. 1998) (determining a products liability action
against a brain shunt manufacturer).
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by defendant's product, a silicon shunt."6
These cases illustrate that gatekeepers have not opened the
floodgates. Judges are making serious attempts to ensure the qual-
ity of expert testimony. Proposed testimony at the far reaches, for
example, where conclusions are based on unfair, unsupportable or
irrelevant assumptions, should never reach a jury. Judges are not
only obliged to perform a Daubert analysis, but may also exclude tes-
timony if the witness is not qualified and exclude evidence under
Rules 104 and 403. 7 Moreover, judges may find that although ad-
missible or admitted, expert testimony would be or was inadequate
to support a verdict.78 Where there is a consensus among main-
stream scientists, for example the accepted methodology for testing
for chemical sensitivity," testimony to the contrary will have a sig-
nificant hurdle to pass before being admitted. Should it be admit-
ted, it then must withstand attacks on its credibility and veracity.
It is the lack of consensus among mainstream scientists, a form
of scientific uncertainty, that underlies the concerns expressed by
Foster and Huber. The solution is not to foreclose judicial consid-
eration. Civil litigation and the administration of justice, after all,
must progress. Perhaps the scientific community would do well to
close the gaps it can, as surely scientists are attempting to do. In
the meantime, while science is uncertain, for whatever reason, lack
of consensus or conflicting theories, or untested or untestable hy-
potheses, we have two options: preclude all expert testimony that in
some fashion is based on some scientific uncertainty, or admit that
evidence, provided it is not irrelevant or without any scientific basis.
This is, again, expert opinion proffered solely for the purpose of
resolving litigation. A determination about the scientific validity of
an expert's testimony does not determine the scientific validity in
any other sense. Scientists are free to test, criticize and publish
their findings. Perhaps the decisions of courts will provide an im-
petus to do so.
76. See id. at 1423.
77. See FED. R. EvrD. 104 & FED. R. EVID. 403.
78. See Wright v. Williamette Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 1996)
(reversing denial of motion for judgment as a mater of law); Conde v. Velsicol
Chem. Corp., 24 F.3d 809, 814 (1994) (grant of motion for summary judgment
affirmed); Elkins v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 8 F.3d 1068, 1073 (6th Cir. 1993) (af-
firming the district court).
79. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 943 (3d Cir. 1990)
(involving a couple seeking damages from a pharmaceutical company for their
child's severe birth defects).
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D. Elitism
We should be mindful of another issue embedded in the con-
troversy over expert testimony: Americans value their day in court.
Although Foster and Huber acknowledge this principle in theory,0
their argument rejects it. If only elite-group expert testimony were
admissible, a plaintiff's day may never come. But people are in-
jured. They attribute (rightly or wrongly) their injuries to certain
causes, and seek resolution through a court of law rather than no
redress at all or in other forums. We generally allow recovery upon
proof by the preponderance of the evidence, not scientific cer-
tainty,8' a misnomer in any event. The decision to establish the
lowest burden of proof reflects the belief that our legal system is
the repository for resolving personal injury disputes. The fre-
quency at which so-called sophist82 testimony is both presented to a
jury and which provides the basis for a verdict is not documented in
Judging Science. One must wonder if this purported problem is as
widespread as the outcry over junk science suggests. Anecdotes do
not prove widespread validity.
III. CONCLUSION
In the end, the process of filtering scientific evidence involves
weighing conflicting values. On one hand we value our jury system,
and on the other we value a high-quality scientific process and the
benefits of its results. Foster and Huber would have us tip the
scales towards an exclusionary scientific process for all purposes.
The Supreme Court disagrees. With over twenty amicus curiae briefs
filed in Daubert and judging by their discussion of the scientific
process, the Court was well aware of the stakes at issue. The justices
apparently also realized that they were not drastically interfering
with the scientific process. Again, at least no one has empirically
shown how what I would call "litigation science," science which may
or may not be mainstream, but certainly not 'junk," and which is
used during the course of litigation, have materially altered the
80. See FOSTER& HUBER, supra note 24, at 22..
81. See Goodrich v. Betroski, 99 F.3d 505, 526 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[A] CERCLA
plaintiff is not required to prove its case with scientific certainty; a preponderance
of the evidence is enough .... While certainty is an ideal pursued by scientists and
courts alike, it is not always realistic goal in environmental science where certainty
can be elusive.") (citations omitted).
82. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 24, at 249-50.
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traditional scientific world. What we have, perhaps, are co-existing,
sometimes co-dependent worlds. One, in which science used in
litigation may pass elite muster, or it may not. Two, the private,
self-regulating system of science that exists outside of the legal sys-
tem. The terrible harm 'in this is not obvious or proven.
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